As U.S. attention drifts from the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan and its regional partners are recalibrating alliances, opening the door to deeper engagement with China and a reshaped balance of power, writes Hamza Zaman.
CHENG LI-WUN, the chairwoman of the Kuomintang (KMT), Taiwan's primary opposition party, made a historic visit to the People's Republic of China.
This was the first such visit by a KMT chair in the past decade, and the meeting between Cheng Li-wun and Chinese President Xi Jinping suggested a potential diplomatic rapprochement.
China announced a set of ten incentive measures for Taiwan as an attempt to revive the bilateral relations and transcend political confrontation and mutual hostility. This includes the reinstatement of tourist visits from Shanghai and Fujian province to Taiwan, facilitation of food sales, easing inspection standards for food and fish and exchange of dramas between the two nations.
This cross-strait reconciliation, however, is not spurred by a domestic desire for reunification. The timing of this deepening convergence is juxtaposed with U.S. President Trump’s drifting focus from the Indo-Pacific and Taiwan.
Since his return to the Oval Office, Trump has limited his reliance on the Quad as the predominant security arrangement to counter China in the Indo-Pacific, prioritising tariffs and export control regime for advanced chips.
The American indifference towards its Indo-Pacific allies became evident during the U.S.-Israel conflict regarding Iran. The U.S. transferred its Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system from the Korean Peninsula to the Middle East to compensate for the depleted batteries and interceptors. It also deployed thousands of marines along with the USS Tripoli, an amphibious assault ship stationed in Japan, to the Middle East.
This force posture diversion exacerbates the security concerns of the American Indo-Pacific allies, including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The waning U.S. security umbrella implies that these Indo-Pacific allies can no longer rely on American security assurances. The vulnerability of American extended deterrence was further exposed when the U.S. conclusively failed to safeguard its Gulf allies against Iranian drone and missile assaults.
Trump’s strategic priorities compel its Indo-Pacific allies to reorient their strategic direction. The unreliability of the American security assurances has forced the Quad members to seek strategic autonomy, as evidenced by growing strategic ties between Japan and Australia. Both nations signed a US$7 billion (AU$9.7 billion) warships deal amidst growing security concerns. Under this agreement, three stealth frigates will be built in Japan and eight in Western Australia.
The upcoming visit of Japanese PM Sanae Takaichi to Australia will further strengthen intra-Quad security and economic ties while alleviating reliance on the U.S. This indicates evolving Indo-Pacific alliances and priorities without overtly relying on American security assurances.
The uncertainty of American extended deterrence and its role as a strategic protector is also prompting a strategic recalibration in Taiwan. The Taiwanese politicians are becoming increasingly sceptical of American assurances. They perceive the American view of Taiwan as analogous to Ukraine in the Indo-Pacific, where the U.S. continues to supply weapons worth billions of dollars, propelling its military industrial complex, while fueling discrepancies between Taiwan and the PRC.
The Taiwanese leaders are realising that, much akin to Ukraine, the American elite will forget their woes in a few years, leaving them at the mercy of China. The hoax of the American strategic umbrella is becoming evident through President Trump’s indifference towards his Indo-Pacific partners, especially Taiwan.
President Trump has demanded that Taiwan pay the U.S. for defending it against China. In reality, the U.S. does not have any military presence on the island and cannot actively defend the country in case of a Chinese onslaught.
President Trump signalled strategic detachment from Taiwan after Operation Absolute Resolve in Venezuela. President Trump asserted that, though the U.S. operation in Venezuela does not provide China a precedent, it is up to President Xi how he deals with Taiwan. President Trump’s “America First” approach gives the least importance to protecting Taiwanese sovereignty.
The visit of the Kuomintang’s chair to the People's Republic of China demonstrates that Taiwan recognises shifting American priorities and no longer takes American security assurances for granted. Taiwan's rapprochement with the PRC extends beyond conventional hedging; it signifies a transformation in regional alliances and exemplifies adaptive realism. It is not solely a political alignment but manifests Taiwan's strategic necessity to transcend the deception of the U.S. military protection.
The persisting American indifference towards its Indo-Pacific allies, including Taiwan, broadens the strategic space for China, allowing the CCP to extend its influence in the region. The meeting between President Xi and Vietnam's communist chief Tô Lâm, right after the Xi-Wun meeting, indicates China’s capitalisation of the strategic vacuum in the Indo-Pacific.
China appears to be gaining ground in the region, placing it in a better position for the upcoming Xi-Trump Summit. The PRC will utilise these gains and push for a more lucrative deal, thus consolidating its grip on the region. The drifting American focus in the Indo-Pacific has led to the abandonment of the American allies, forcing them to collaborate among themselves or seek reconciliation with their arch-nemesis — China.
Hamza Zaman is an Assistant Research Associate at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Australia License
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